Journalists die at high rates while
covering protests in the Arab world and elsewhere. Photographers and
freelancers appear vulnerable. Pakistan is again the deadliest nation. A CPJ special report

Journalists die at high rates while
covering protests in the Arab world and elsewhere. Photographers and
freelancers appear vulnerable. Pakistan is again the deadliest nation. A CPJ special report
In our special report, "The 10 Tools of Online Oppressors," CPJ examines the 10 prevailing strategies of online oppression worldwide and the countries that have taken the lead in their use. In this accompanying podcast, CPJ Deputy Director Robert Mahoney notes that these strategies range from sophisticated cyber-attacks to traditional brute-force techniques. Listen to the podcast on the player above, or right click here to download an MP3. (2:47)
Read CPJ's special report, "The 10 Tools of Online Oppressors."
By Mohamed Abdel Dayem
Relying on an extensive network of sources in the military, government, and Islamist groups, Yemeni freelance journalist Abdulelah Shaea had become a frequent and pointed critic of the administration's counterterrorism efforts. By July, President Ali Abdullah Saleh's government had enough, dispatching security agents to seize and roughly interrogate Shaea for several hours about his reporting.
On Sunday, the
privately owned broadcaster Hannibal TV was forced off the air for more than three
hours. The state-owned news agency Agence Tunis Afrique Presse (TAP) issued a statement
stating that an arrest warrant had been issued for the station's owner on
charges of "high treason" for an alleged "plot to destabilize national
security." The statement accused the owner of using the Hannibal broadcasts to
undermine Tunisia's stability.
There has been a great deal written online about how much of a positive role the Internet played in recent events in Tunisia (if you'd like to catch up, Alex Howard's link round-up provides a good summary of the many sides, both for and against). At CPJ, our focus is on slightly different questions: How did the repression of the Internet hamper the ability to safely gather news, report and analyze such events? Did that repression grow worse in the dying days of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's government? Will it improve in the future?
For those who have spent countless hours exposing and combating Tunisia's vast press freedom abuses, today is truly a glorious day. Tunisian authorities released the ailing imprisoned journalist Fahem Boukadous, a day after CPJ called on the transitional government to honor its pledge to free all political prisoners. Today, we can loudly proclaim that no journalist or blogger is imprisoned in the government's dungeons and that Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's censorship is no longer imposed on Tunisians.
So much has happened in Tunisia since I last blogged on the large-scale phishing attacks against activists and journalists in the country. With the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and a new interim government in place, online censorship seems to be ending. Opposition media and human rights sites are viewable, and CPJ's Tunisia reports are now available in the country (although it was always possible to access them through our https service). Social networking sites such as Facebook are available without the password-stealing code of the previous cybersecurity regime. I've yet to hear of any site that remains blocked, although Tunisia's filtering system was so byzantine, it's hard to conclusively tell whether it has been completely shut down.